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Welcome 
 
James Keyte 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute Director and Adjunct Professor of Law, 
Fordham Law School; Director of Global Development, The Brattle Group 
 
MR. KEYTE:  Welcome, everybody, to the 47th 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy put on by the Fordham Competition Law 
Institute. 
First, we wish all the best health and 
safety in this time of pandemic, which is both tragic 
and challenging. 
As for the Conference, when Barry Hawk 
founded the Fordham Competition Law Institute I’m not 
sure he envisioned how international it would be in 
terms of antitrust law and policy; and, of course, the 
role of economics in the 1970s was pretty much 
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nonexistent and just on the horizon in some of the 
U.S. courts.  Now we cannot think of antitrust law and 
policy and economics without a global focus, 
especially in today’s digital economy.   
By necessity, this is the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute’s first virtual conference.  All of our 
work lives and families have all changed.  We have 
gotten used to being more mobile.  We have seen 
probably more of our families than even some of them 
care for.  I finally learned how to use a computer, 
how to do track changes.  But it all seems fitting in 
an economy that is fully digital. 
For our Fordham Conference we have stayed on 
the basic format, with a few changes.   
We had a Workshop Day yesterday with two 
wonderful economic workshops with Edgeworth Economics 
and The Brattle Group.  
We typically also have an in-person Heads of 
Authority Workshop that is a private meeting, but 
instead in the virtual environment we had a Heads of 
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Authority Q&A Session yesterday with seven fantastic 
heads of authority.  It was very interactive, with 
questions and answers and questions from the audience.   
Today we start the main Conference.  We have 
fantastic keynotes; we have panels on tech and on 
mergers; we have a Fireside Chat with Barry Hawk and 
Bill Kovacic, which I encourage you to listen in on.  
It will be all the more interactive with some 
questions at the end of each session coming from you 
all in the audience. 
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Keynote Remarks 
 
MR. KEYTE:  Let’s get started with our first 
keynotes and panel discussion. 
Neither of our keynotes nor our panel need 
much in the way of introductions, but I will do it 
briefly. 
For Executive Vice President Vestager, this 
is not easy.  She has two extremely critical roles in 
the European Union, Executive Vice President of the 
European Commission for Europe Fit for the Digital 
Age, a very appropriate title, and of course the 
European Commissioner for Competition, a position she 
has held for a significant period of time.  Prior to 
that, Executive Vice President Vestager had an 
enormously successful political career in Denmark, 
including as Minister for Economic Interior Affairs. 
But her real impact has been, especially for 
the focus of this Conference, as Commissioner for 
Competition and in her Executive Vice President role, 
leading enormous investigations and review of policy 
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in platforms, in tech, in privacy, in State Aid — and, 
in some sense, it feels like it is still just the 
beginning because she is so much a leader in this 
critical area of antitrust and international antitrust 
law and policy. 
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim 
has also had an enormous impact here in the United 
States.  Like myself, he is from Los Angeles.  He went 
to UCLA and George Washington.  People don’t probably 
know he has a Masters of Science in biotech from Johns 
Hopkins.  He had a very successful intellectual 
property and antitrust practice.  He was Chief of 
Staff and Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  In the Bush Administration, he was very 
known for being both creative and practical. 
He is extremely active with respect to 
cartel enforcement; merger enforcement — I think to 
the surprise of many — looking creatively at different 
types of analyses on merger effects; and obviously, 
very active with respect to the overlap between 
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intellectual property and antitrust.   
In fact, the amicus program from the 
Department of Justice has been quite influential in 
the courts.  I think it also gives good ex ante advice 
for businesses, and I think it is a very useful and 
practical shift from the agencies to do that in their 
interaction with the courts.  The DOJ is right in the 
thick of it and we look forward to more of that in the 
coming months for sure. 
Our two panelists are both established and 
rising luminaries of antitrust. The panelists will do 
a Q&A with the keynotes after their keynote remarks. 
Howard Shelanski is a Professor of Law at 
Georgetown; JD, PhD in Economics from Berkeley; served 
in several roles in the Obama Administration; clerked 
in the circuit and then in the Supreme Court for 
Scalia; Chief Economist at the FTC; FTC Director of 
the Bureau of Economics; and is currently also a 
Partner at Davis Polk. 
Michele Davis is a true rising star from 
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Freshfields in both mergers and Articles 101 and 102 
advice, a real litigator on her feet.  Her education: 
post-grad at Oxford, Harvard Law.  She will also offer 
an interesting perspective on the ground in both 
London and Brussels. 
Now Executive Vice President Vestager’s 
remarks.  Thank you very much.  
 
 
Margrethe Vestager 
Executive Vice President, A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, and Competition 
Commissioner, European Commission 
 
 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER: A very 
warm introduction.   
It is impossible to participate in the 
annual Fordham Conference without reflecting on the 
history.  It is the longest-running forum for 
transatlantic cooperation and exchange in the field of 
competition law — so long-running, in fact, that it 
was first held in the autumn of 1974, before the 
Department of Justice filed its historic antitrust 
suit against AT&T. 
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In those days, DG-Competition (or DG-IV as 
we were called then) was a young, inexperienced 
competition authority compared to our U.S. 
counterparts, and we came to Fordham and listened and 
learned.  We used this knowledge to develop our 
approach, often in concert with our transatlantic 
partners. 
It is particularly true, for example, for 
our merger policy, something that crystallized in 1990 
with the entry into force of the EU Merger Regulation.  
I will spare you the calculation; it is now thirty 
years ago. 
Today EU competition policy has forged its 
path fully invested in shaping the international 
discussion, and that is only natural since we have 
seen the first-hand benefits of competition law 
enforcement and international cooperation in doing so. 
As the economy has become more and more 
global, harmful practices of larger market players 
extended more and more beyond the limits of the 
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jurisdiction of any single competition law enforcer. 
Formerly, governments signed cooperation 
agreements — the European Union and United States did 
so in 1991 — but the informal networks behind them 
were forged long before, thanks very much to things 
like Fordham. 
So we are in the right place for a serious 
discussion.  
The extraordinary events of the last many 
months bring up fresh challenges, challenges that call 
for serious discussions.  The coronavirus crisis has 
hit us hard and it has hit us fast.  It is a crisis of 
profound human tragedy — so many people have lost 
their lives; so many people have lost their loved ones 
— and it is a crisis that also severely damages our 
economy; it has forced workplaces to close; millions 
of workers have been put into temporary unemployment, 
and some even in redundancy.  
Emergency measures taken all around the 
planet have helped lessen the immediate impact of 
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lockdowns on workers and consumer demand.  We can, and 
we should, continue to intervene to reduce the harmful 
effects on the labor market and on the economy as a 
whole. 
But we also have another task: to ensure 
that the recovery and new growth is in line with our 
principles and our strategic priorities of green and 
digital transition. 
For us in Europe, this will in the first 
place depend on a European Single Market that is 
unfragmented and that functions properly.  We need 
fair and contestable markets because they make us 
better off.  They signal where investments should 
flow.  They tell us where value is and who is creating 
value in the economy. 
A deep and unexpected crisis, like the one 
we are in right now, doesn’t change any of that.  If 
anything, it reinforces what we already knew.  It is 
precisely when things are changing fast that we need 
to rely on our fundamentals most.   
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The crisis and the recovery, as we all sadly 
know, have losers and winners too.  So much is sure, 
is a given — we know that from our experiences — but 
which firms will win and which will lose in the crisis 
that we are in and have ahead of us?  In my 
experience, that is not a question  that politicians 
can answer, at least not very well. 
That brings us back to the Single Market.  
The more competitive and the more contestable that it 
remains, the better investment will flow where it is 
truly needed.  The result will be a quicker, a 
stronger, a more sustainable recovery, and this is 
what we need.  It will be our compass in the coming 
months and the coming years and we will need to 
manage, to be able to navigate in I think quite stormy 
waters ahead of us. 
Our competition rules give us a formidable 
toolkit to defend the Single Market.  Each of the 
three instruments — antitrust, mergers, State aid — 
has a role to play, and each of them will be 
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challenged by the crisis. 
For antitrust it is a priority to continue 
to pursue and unmask cartels.  Collusion causes most 
harm to competition because it takes place behind a 
veil of dishonesty.  Collusion leads to artificially 
high prices and slows down innovation. 
Just last week, the Commission adopted a 
decision against three components manufacturers in the 
car industry representing two separate cartels with a 
total fine of €80 million. 
Part of the antitrust battle lies in being 
clear and transparent about what is and what is not 
allowed.  To this end, from the very outset of the 
crisis we offered guidance.  We provided an ad hoc 
comfort letter in relation to agreements to tackle 
shortages of essential products due to the Covid-19 
crisis. 
The Covid-19 crisis is obviously an 
unprecedented situation for many sectors, not just 
essential products, so we have been open to clarify 
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what kinds of cooperation are unproblematic and 
identify the necessary safeguards for cooperation to 
bring benefits without the risk of unwanted effects.  
We have done so through informal feedback to companies 
that have been approaching us.  For example, we have 
had very useful exchanges with representatives of the 
automotive sector. 
We must also continue to fight abuse of 
dominance.  Dominance is nothing new, but in times of 
crisis there is an added concern: when money is tight, 
having deep pockets matters, and that heightens the 
risks posed by predatory pricing behavior or other 
forms of exclusion. 
Fighting dominance can also mean changing 
our enforcement approach. Yesterday we adopted our 
final decision in the Broadcom case, for which interim 
measures were announced earlier in the year.  This is 
the first time interim measures have been used in a 
case leading to commitments, but I don’t think that 
this will be the last one. They can prevent 
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irreparable harm to competition during the time it 
takes to reach a final decision, and obviously it is 
when markets are moving fast that this will matter the 
most.  They do something else in addition to 
preventing irreparable harm while the case is being 
investigated: they also create the right incentive for 
companies to work with enforcers to reach commitments. 
Another key challenge in antitrust is 
keeping up to speed on new and emerging areas of 
business.  In June we launched a section inquiry in 
the Internet of Things to understand the market 
dynamics for networked products and services where 
data plays a very big role.  With markets shifting, 
new technologies emerging, it is likely that we will 
bring more sector inquiries in the near future. 
Finally, we need to make sure that our 
antitrust toolkit is up-to-date, and that may mean new 
powers to enforce.  What is currently missing in our 
toolbox is the possibility to carry out market 
investigations into structural issues that create 
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inefficiencies, in particular in digital markets. 
We are working on a new legislative proposal 
focusing on digital markets which will feature two 
complementary pillars: a combination of ex ante 
regulation and case-by-case enforcement.   
The regulatory side will target a small 
number of large gatekeepers, setting out a clear list 
of do’s and don’ts.  Yes, you should make certain data 
available to platform users; and no, you should not 
engage in proven forms of harmful self-preferencing. 
The case-by-case enforcement side will allow 
us to investigate digital markets and intervene by 
imposing remedies where we identify a structural 
market issue of failure. 
Of course, the reach of these markets means 
that this is a shared challenge for competition 
enforcers everywhere.  I was very pleased to see in 
the report published by the House Judiciary Committee 
that it covers many of the same issues that we are 
faced with in Europe. 
 16 
 
 
 
 
Regarding mergers, we have seen a temporary 
reduction in notifications, although the decline has 
been quite small.  There have also been some delays in 
responses to questions.  But merger enforcement never 
stops. 
In the near future we expect to see 
consolidations.  I think it is often the case after a 
crisis that industry tends to reorganize itself 
following a shock.  The biggest issue for us will of 
course be to avoid excessive concentration that will 
adversely affect European businesses and consumers. 
The crisis may also form the background for 
more recourse to the failing-firm defense.  That may 
be the case if a company wants to a buy weakened 
rival. That makes our criteria even more important 
than ever — the failing firm’s future in the market; 
the availability of other options that harm 
competition less; the final fate of the assets if the 
firm actually were to fail — and any departure from 
these criteria would mean falling into the trap of 
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allowing the crisis to lead us away from our 
objective, which is to preserve open and competitive 
markets. 
The final instrument is State aid, something 
that, as you all know, is uniquely European.  State 
aid is here in order to ensure that companies compete 
on real equal terms, also when it comes to subsidies 
from Member States.  It also helps Member States to do 
more with less by using competition to drive down 
costs and by making best use of limited public and 
private resources. 
Now State aid control is more relevant than 
ever.  At the start of the crisis, we adopted 
temporary rules to enable Member States to support 
businesses suffering from the extraordinary 
restrictions taken to contain the virus.  This 
response was necessary to preserve value, to preserve 
jobs, and also to set the conditions to protect fair 
competition. 
Given the continued economic uncertainty, we 
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are in the process of prolonging and adopting these 
rules until mid-2021.  But, of course, temporary rules 
must remain temporary, and we are at the same time 
thinking about what the right conditions would be to 
enable much needed forward-looking investment while 
preserving the level playing field. 
Which also brings me to my last point, which 
is that State aid control also contributes to fight 
tax avoidance.  Subsidies can come in many forms — a 
favorable loan, a piece of land, a tax advantage given 
selectively to a company.  If Member States allow a 
handful of companies to pay a lot less in taxes than 
their rivals, that undermines fair competition and it 
also deprives the public purse of funds for much 
needed investment. 
Before the summer the General Court — which 
for a case is like the first instance — annulled the 
Commission’s State aid decision in Apple.  In the 
decision we found that Apple received illegal tax 
advantages in Ireland.  Of course, we have very 
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carefully reviewed the judgment, and after doing so we 
believe that the Court has made certain errors of law.  
That is why we have appealed the judgment to the 
higher instance, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. 
For example, we are seeking clarity on a 
legal issue concerning the treatment of the different 
companies within the group for tax purposes.  It is a 
well-established principle that for tax purposes 
companies within a group should be treated as if they 
were separate entities operating independently from 
each other.   
However, the judgment seemed to imply that 
when assessing the tax treatment of Apple Group 
companies in Ireland the Commission should have taken 
into account the role of employees and directors of 
Apple Inc. in the United States in managing Apple’s 
intellectual property, although these were separate 
and distinct companies and although Apple Inc. was 
paid billions of euros for its management services 
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through a cost-sharing agreement. 
This has far-reaching consequences.  It is 
undisputed that Apple’s Irish Group companies recorded 
almost all profits generated by sales of Apple’s 
products outside of the Americas.  They were able to 
do so because they owned a license to use Apple’s 
intellectual property outside of the Americas, and 
they obtained that license by making annual payments 
to Apple Inc. in the United States under the cost-
sharing agreement. 
Unless parent and group companies are 
treated as separate entities, companies can have  
their cake and eat it.  They can reduce their taxable 
profits by paying for a license while at the same time 
claim that the profits resulting from that license 
should be taxed elsewhere.  In the case of Apple, that 
meant for the year 2011 €16 billion of profits 
recorded in Ireland of which only €50 million were 
considered to be taxable in Ireland and the remainder 
was then taxed nowhere.  
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We now have to wait for the European Court 
of Justice to deliver its judgment, but two things are 
already clear.  First, we will continue our efforts to 
make sure that selective tax advantages do not 
undermine fair competition.  Second, we need to push 
ahead to put in place the right regulation to address 
tax loopholes and ensure transparency. 
I have said a lot, but I realize that I am 
actually really just scratching the surface.  I am 
sure that, with the wonderful program outlined in the 
introduction, in the course of this Conference we will 
have a lot to learn, a lot to hear, and have many more 
perspectives on the crisis and where we are headed.  
This crisis has kept us apart.  At times I 
have found it very, very difficult and painful to 
manage the lack of a face-to-face, of a real 
interaction, of coming together.   
I think, though, that now we cannot be any 
different.  It has in some sense also brought us 
closer together in some ways because for competition 
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policy it crystallizes what we share, what we have in 
common, as practitioners as well as as policymakers.  
I want to thank you for that closeness in our approach 
and in sharing, I think a very common and a very 
important mission. 
Thank you very much. 
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“Video Killed the Radio Star”: Promoting a Culture of Innovation 
Makan Delrahim 
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM: Good 
morning. Thank you for the earlier introduction, 
James, and thanks again to the Fordham Competition Law 
Institute for inviting me back to participate today. 
I know firsthand we have all recently 
learned the challenges of hosting virtual 
international events, and I congratulate you for 
making this important event possible despite the 
obstacles we face. 
I also want to acknowledge and thank and say 
what a privilege it is for me to appear again with 
Commissioner and Executive Vice President Vestager, 
for her continued contributions to promote a culture 
of competition and for the valuable and constructive 
partnership she and I have had these past three years 
I have been privileged to be in this job.  We have 
accomplished a lot, worked civilly through minor 
disagreements, and have together improved in my view 
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the free markets to the benefit of consumers across 
the globe. 
Some of us are old enough to remember that 
life-changing moment when MTV launched in August of 
1981.  As you may know, the first video MTV aired was 
a song by The Buggles called Video Killed the Radio 
Star, which happens to be the title of these remarks.  
The song is about the transformative power of 
innovation.  A new form of musical entertainment had 
arrived on the scene and radio’s dominance was under a 
very real threat. 
Today, nearly forty years later, MTV’s video 
stars long since have been killed by technologies that 
followed.  That particular song’s sentiment 
nonetheless remains as relevant to antitrust policy as 
ever.  Innovation and technology continually are 
changing markets and the economic landscape, and even 
creating whole new industries, industries we couldn’t 
imagine just a few years ago let alone forty years 
ago.  It is incumbent on competition law enforcers to 
 25 
 
 
 
 
champion policies that support the incentives for the 
next generation of the “video stars” to emerge.  
 The pandemic has underscored the importance 
of protecting the climate for innovation.  We all are 
counting on innovations in medical science for the 
development of strategies to treat and protect us from 
infection, and of course every one of us, including at 
this conference, are affected, whether it is education 
or health or just our entertainment that this pandemic 
has forced to move to the digital realm. 
Today I would like to share some examples of 
the innovations that the Antitrust Division has 
undertaken to ensure that we enforce the antitrust 
laws in a way that accomplishes the goals of 
protecting competition and also supporting growth and 
innovation. 
Over the past there years, we have taken a 
fresh look at the Division’s policies across nearly 
all aspects of our work to ensure that they accomplish 
these aims.  A mindset of embracing flexibility and 
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adaptability served and continues to serve us well as 
we pivoted to telework and pandemic-related 
competition challenges.  In many ways the pandemic 
actually reinforced our perspective, and experimenting 
with new ways of doing things provides opportunities 
to learn, grow, and ultimately make us better — or, as 
I have noted before, anti-fragile. 
Of course, competition law, as we all know, 
is about protecting a process, not about mandating a 
particular result or favoring one competitor over 
another.  In that spirit we have focused on improving 
processes that promote and sustain conditions of 
innovation to thrive rather than directing specific 
outcomes in the marketplace. 
At the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition 
last fall, I was struck by some familiar insights of 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Jean Tirole.  He is a 
giant figure in the field of competition law and 
economics and he has contributed much.  In that 
particular address, he offered some advice to 
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enforcers for tackling the complex issues we all face 
in the digital space.  He said, “We don’t need more 
laws.  We need more guidance.”  He called for more 
“participative antitrust” between competition agencies 
and stakeholders to consider appropriate enforcement 
or regulatory approaches to modern competition 
challenges.   
I agree with Professor Tirole that our 
existing antitrust laws are up to the task of 
addressing modern competition problems.  Yet, we have 
to be flexible; we need to be self-reflective and 
collaborative to ensure that our approaches keep pace 
with evolving facts and economic wisdom.  
The House Judiciary Committee’s report 
reflects that. It has taken a look, as our 
constitution system with the separation of powers 
allows, for them to constantly be looking at the 
enforcement regime and taking a look to see if there 
are changes that may be required to the system that we 
enforce in the Executive Branch. 
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The participative approach has served us 
well at the Antitrust Division.  In the past three 
years, we have improved our transparency: we actively 
have updated our Guidelines, made speeches, issued 
business review letters, and submitted amicus briefs 
and statements of interest to courts in a deliberate 
effort to share and explain our analytical processes.  
The amicus program was an initiative that we 
launched about three years.  It didn’t really get 
active until about two years ago.  I appreciate, 
James, your mentioning that earlier.  We have seen by 
any objective standard the incredible impact it has 
had on the development of the law: narrowing 
immunities where folks have advanced very broad 
immunities and defense in many cases, and also the 
proper interpretation of the laws. 
 Clear guidance helps mitigate the risks 
innovators and entrepreneurs face when investing 
resources to develop new products.   
Whenever possible, we welcome a wide range 
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of views, including from industry participants, 
academics, and consumer advocates.  For example, we 
regularly hold public workshops and post draft 
Guidelines for public comment.   
The dialogue that plays out in these fora 
inevitably leads to better and more thoughtful 
results.  You may have noticed that I often invite the 
views of my biggest detractors that we have had over 
the past few years, and I welcome and thank them for 
their views, and I think they add to the process to 
help improve the process and the final product. 
I would now like to share some specific 
examples of the Division’s efforts to promote 
innovation, which I will group into four broad 
categories: (1) better explaining the state of the 
antitrust laws relating to patent licensing practices; 
(2) promoting substantive and procedural convergence 
with our international partners; (3) modernizing our 
domestic enforcement program; and (4) encouraging 
innovation within the Antitrust Division itself.   
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“New Madison” Approach 
I will start with our approach to the 
intersection of antitrust and intellectual property 
law, a critical area for innovation policy I think.   
I first presented an updated and transparent 
analytical framework based on neutral principles last 
year in a speech followed by an article called The 
“New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property Law.  This was published in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School’s Journal of Law and 
Innovation. 
This correctly balanced approach is aimed at 
ensuring continued innovation and dynamic competition 
in the context of standard setting.  We have cautioned 
that antitrust law should not be used as a tool to 
police contractual commitments to license standard-
essential patents on fair, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.  When licensing 
negotiations fail, patent owners should have the full 
range of statutory remedies available to them when 
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their patents are infringed, including injunctions, 
the right to exclude.  At the same time, coordination 
among members — competitors — of standards development 
organizations can raise competition concerns that 
should not be overlooked.  We have advocated for these 
principles through speeches, guidance documents, 
business review letters, and statements of interest in 
various federal courts.     
I am encouraged that the principles of this 
New Madison approach continue to gain acceptance not 
only in the courts in the United States but in 
international courts as well.   
In May, the German Federal Court of Justice 
issued its decision in Sisvel v. Haier in support of a 
standard-essential patent holder’s enforcement 
rights.  The German high court held that an 
implementer must take an active role in negotiations 
and be willing to take on a license on any terms that 
are FRAND. 
Other German courts have echoed this concern 
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for patent holder rights.  In a decision in early 
September in a dispute between patent-holder Sharp 
Corporation and implementer Daimler, a Munich court 
rejected Daimler’s antitrust-law based defense and 
attacks on that system.  The court granted the 
Japanese corporation Sharp’s injunction request 
against Daimler’s sales of the Mercedes-Benz for 
infringing Sharp’s patent which is essential to LTE 
technology. 
We have also seen that in the UK Supreme 
Court’s decision in August in Unwired Planet v. 
Huawei. 
These decisions are important successes 
reflecting the continued development of the thinking 
and the proper approach and the convergence of legal 
systems around the principles outlined in the New 
Madison approach as the right way to look at these in 
a way to ensure maximum innovation incentives, and in 
doing so they promote innovation.  
International Engagement 
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This leads me to the topic of international 
engagement more generally, which has been a key focus 
of my tenure at the Antitrust Division.   
With more than 140 competition agencies 
around the world, and as mergers and conduct 
increasingly draw attention from enforcers in multiple 
jurisdictions, convergence on substantive and 
procedural approaches is more and more critical.   
As the great American innovator Henry Ford 
once said, “Coming together is a beginning, staying 
together is progress, and working together is a 
success.”   
I think we have had many successes over the 
past several years and I look forward to continued 
success with our partners abroad. 
We have worked together as a strong 
community of international enforcers as we have 
reacted in real time to the many challenges posed by 
the pandemic.   
Since March, the Division has participated 
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in a number of virtual events hosted by multilateral 
organizations — such as the ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD — to 
compare notes on pandemic responses and to make sure 
we learn from each other’s experiences.  We appreciate 
the opportunities to learn from others in these 
unprecedented times and to help contribute our 
experience to the extent it is helpful. 
We have not neglected our other priorities 
in the meantime.   
Promoting greater procedural norms and due 
process is a prime example.  The International 
Competition Network’s Framework for Competition Agency 
Procedures (CAP) is a huge step forward toward 
harmonizing due process principles, principles that we 
have lived by here in the United States, in Europe, 
and in multiple jurisdictions abroad. 
When I first announced the initiative in 
June 2018, at that time called the Multilateral 
Framework on Procedures (MFP), I urged competition 
authorities to go beyond soft commitments and sign on 
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to a multilateral agreement on due process that 
included meaningful compliance mechanisms.  Less than 
a year later, that vision was fulfilled when the CAP 
came into effect through the ICN with seventy founding 
competition agencies, importantly including 
authorities in Europe, Canada, and the United States.  
We all came together and recognized the 
importance of sending this signal.  I think through 
this agreement we will all be more transparent, 
predictable, and consistent as law enforcers, and we 
will continue to build trust in our enforcement 
actions.  
The CAP also represents a remarkable 
achievement for the ICN itself, an innovative 
organization in its own right.  The ICN was launched 
less than twenty years ago by a group of fifteen 
agencies, including the Antitrust Division.  Today, 
the ICN has grown to include 138 member agencies from 
125 jurisdictions.  It has become an influential force 
in driving sound policy through recommendations and 
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guidance for its members.   
A recent example of the ICN’s meaningful 
policy work is this year’s Guidance on Enhancing 
Cross-Border Leniency Cooperation.  The ICN’s 
influence was on display last month at the ICN 2020 
conference — which had to be held virtually and 
unfortunately not in my home town of Los Angeles — 
that was hosted by the Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission.  It featured spirited 
discussions on some of the most challenging issues in 
competition policy, including the issues of High 
Tech.  
The OECD is another great and important 
forum for advancing international convergence that 
enhances innovation for the benefit of consumers.  The 
Competition Committee’s biannual meetings provide an 
opportunity for wide-ranging competition policy 
discussions.  I mentioned Professor Tirole’s great 
presentation this last fall. 
Over the last three years alone, we have 
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addressed the digital economy, intellectual property 
licensing, labor, education, and fin-tech markets, to 
name just a few of many topics we have addressed at 
the Competition Committee.  It has been a true 
privilege for me to have chaired the Working Party 3 
of the Competition Committee, where so much has been 
accomplished. 
Cooperation with respect to specific cases 
has increased substantially in recent years as the 
number of jurisdictions active in merger review has 
grown.   
We communicate with our global counterparts 
on a daily basis.  Last year, we collaborated with at 
least twenty-five jurisdictions on cross-border 
investigations and global cartel enforcement and with 
fifteen international counterparts on merger and civil 
nonmerger matters alone.  These are actual specific 
matters of enforcement, not the broader policy 
discussions and the convergence, where we engage with 
over a hundred agencies through the various fora.  
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There is still much work to be done, 
particularly as agencies around the globe grapple with 
the challenging issues presented by the digital 
economy.   
At the Antitrust Division, we are 
continually looking for innovative ways to strengthen 
international cooperation.  For example, in September, 
a month ago, I signed a new competition enforcement 
Framework among the DOJ, the FTC, and the competition 
agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom. The Framework provides the basis for 
future bilateral agreements focused on investigative 
assistance.      
Innovations in Domestic Enforcement 
Let me now turn to a number of domestic 
enforcement initiatives that we have launched aimed at 
promoting free markets and a culture of innovation. 
Not surprisingly, over the past seven 
months, responding to the Covid-19 pandemic has been 
the key priority.  In March 2020, the Antitrust 
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Division and the FTC announced an expedited process 
for reviewing and providing guidance relating to 
collaborations of businesses working to protect the 
health and safety of Americans during the 
pandemic. The Antitrust Division has issued four 
Covid-19-related business review letters through this 
process.  We have done this within a week.  These are 
processes and reviews that normally could take nine 
months or over a year. 
At the same time, we remain vigilant about 
combatting anticompetitive behavior by firms seeking 
to take advantage of the turmoil.  The pandemic did 
not sideline other important efforts to rethink and 
improve our enforcement program.   
One of these was we withdrew and 
reconsidered and issued new merger remedies guidance. 
The last one was the Division’s 2011 guidance from 
which we withdrew.  The DOJ’s modernized Merger 
Remedies Manual, released in September, reflects our 
strong preference for structural over behavioral 
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remedies as the proper solution to problematic merger 
transactions.  
As I have explained before, antitrust law is 
law enforcement, it is not regulation. We have not 
been given a license to meddle in day-to-day business 
as a condition of merger approval.  Merger either 
violates the law or it does not.  Behavioral remedies 
tend to be regulatory in nature and entangle the 
Division and the courts in the ongoing operation of a 
market, which is inefficient and probably improper in 
most instances. Often, these types of behavioral 
remedies will distort the market and stifle the 
innovation and competition that we should be 
advancing. 
In a similar vein, we undertook a 
comprehensive effort to review nearly 1,300 so-called 
“legacy” judgments, some of which date back to the 
1890s, in our Judgment Termination Initiative.  We 
filed motions in federal district courts across the 
country to terminate decrees that were no longer 
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needed to protect competition, and in some cases were 
potentially harmful to competition.  We posted these 
for public comment, we evaluated each and every one, 
and I believe we have now terminated a little over 800 
of these decrees. 
In a recent case, a federal court in 
Manhattan terminated the Paramount Consent Decrees, 
which for over seventy years had regulated how certain 
movie studios distribute films to movie theatres.  As 
the court noted, Gone with the Wind, The Wizard of Oz, 
and It’s a Wonderful Life were the blockbusters when 
these decrees were litigated.  All great movies, but 
it just shows the age of when those were implemented. 
Our efforts in this regard ensure that 
regulatory decrees do not stand in the way of the free 
market functioning as it should.  God knows how many 
innovative business models the consumers have missed 
out on because of just the Paramount Consent Decree; 
how many different mechanisms that technology would 
have allowed consumers to view and enjoy theatrical 
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movies that had been hampered by these consent 
decrees.  We hope going forward there will be more 
innovation in that field. 
It also frees up the Division’s resources 
and attention so that we may better focus on 
protecting and promoting competition in our day-to-day 
responsibilities.  
Another example of our efforts to advance 
merger policy is the recent update to our guidance on 
vertical mergers, which we revised for the first time 
since 1984, when the Justice Department issued the 
Nonhorizontal Merger Guidelines.   
We, along with the FTC, I’m pleased to 
report, released joint draft Vertical Merger 
Guidelines in February 2020, right before the 
pandemic, and conducted workshops to collect feedback 
and perspectives from diverse groups.  The revised 
final Guidelines, issued in June, provide transparency 
into our approach to evaluating vertical transactions, 
which we are seeing more of these days. 
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Knowing that delays can create business 
uncertainty and harm innovation, we also took a fresh 
look at our merger review processes internally to seek 
ways to streamline our investigations and provide for 
greater predictability.   
In September 2018, I announced a goal of 
resolving most investigations within six months of 
filing, provided that the parties promptly comply with 
Division requests throughout the entire process.  We 
published for the first time a Model Voluntary Request 
Letter and a Model Timing Agreement to facilitate 
expeditious cooperation and compliance and to allow 
for greater predictability and transparency. 
We sought to streamline enforcement actions 
where possible too.  Earlier this year, the Division 
made its first ever use of arbitration to resolve the 
proposed merger of Novelis Inc. and Aleris 
Corporation. The arbitration proved to be an effective 
and efficient way to resolve the one dispositive issue 
in the case, which centers, as it often does, around 
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market definition, and I expect it will be used again 
under the right circumstances. 
Turning to an innovation in our criminal 
program, last November we launched the Procurement 
Collusion Strike Force — or the PCSF as we call it — 
which is an interagency partnership among the 
Antitrust Division, thirteen U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
across the country, investigators from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and four federal Offices of 
Inspectors General.  Liaisons from these agencies are 
working together to detect, deter, and prosecute 
cartels in government contracting.   
It has generated an overwhelmingly positive 
response from stakeholders.  We have received more 
than fifty inquiries to PCSF from federal, state, and 
local government agencies seeking outreach training, 
assistance with safeguarding their procurement 
processes.  Of course, an OECD report some years ago 
had noted that proper deterrence in this field would 
save taxpayers more than 20 percent in the costs 
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outlaid for procurement in the government programs. 
So far, we have opened nearly two dozen PCSF 
grand jury investigations.  And we just appointed our 
first ever permanent Director of the PCSF, Dan Glad, 
who is the Assistant Chief of our New York Field 
Office and a career veteran prosecutor, and we are now 
searching for a permanent Assistant Director given the 
overwhelming response we have had. 
I have joked that by creating the PCSF I 
broke the monopoly that the Antitrust Division has had 
on federal enforcement of these cartels and now we 
have partnered with the very capable U.S. Attorneys 
across the country. 
Promoting a Culture of Innovation Within the 
Antitrust Division 
Finally, I will briefly mention a couple of 
our efforts to encourage innovative thinking within 
the Antitrust Division itself. 
Technological advancements in recent years 
have changed virtually every industry within our 
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purview.   
In August, I announced a restructuring of 
our civil program to ensure efficient and effective 
enforcement that accounts for these changes.  This 
included a realignment of responsibilities within the 
civil sections, which created a new section of 
Financial Services, Fin-tech and Banking, where we 
took various commodities and expertise among four 
different sections and put them into one. 
We also combined our media and entertainment 
sections with our telecommunications section.  Given 
the convergence we are seeing in industry, that just 
seemed to make good efficient sense. 
We also created an Office of Decree 
Enforcement and Compliance to dedicate Division 
personnel to ensuring proactive enforcement of consent 
decrees.  These are consent decrees where the merging 
parties had given their commitments to the public 
through the Justice Department to ensure certain 
conduct and activities and we thought it was important 
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to proactively hold their feet to the fire. 
In addition, we created a Civil Conduct Task 
Force to focus full time on civil nonmerger work where 
the parties may not have the incentive to cooperate 
all the time like they do in mergers because they want 
to get a deal done.  When you are dealing with 
nonmerger work, the parties may have other incentives 
as far as cooperating with the Justice Department.  
We are paying close attention to a number of 
emerging issues, and we are making sure we develop and 
maintain expertise on cutting-edge issues and 
developments.   
Last year, we launched a novel program to 
build our expertise by training some of our attorneys 
and economists in emerging technologies in the fields 
of blockchain, machine learning, and artificial 
intelligence.  We started with a pilot program of 
about nine of our top attorneys and economists.  I 
think it is critical to understand these technologies 
and their growing business applications in all 
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industries.   
We have selected this training through MIT’s 
Sloan School, and so far have trained over thirty of 
our professional staff, all of whom have had an 
overwhelmingly positive response to these courses.  In 
fact, I participated in one of them myself. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the Antitrust Division is 
committed to ensuring that competition policy remains 
a force for good in fostering innovation.   
Back in 1981, video may have killed the 
radio star.  In 2020, however, streaming video 
provides a lifeline for the rest of us to carry on 
with our lives — from learning, shopping, or enforcing 
the antitrust laws — in the face of unprecedented 
physical limitations.   
Recent experience has shown the power of 
technology to improve our quality of life, and also 
how much we have come to depend on it.  As The Buggles 
put it, “We can’t rewind, we’ve gone too far.”  There 
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is no way to predict what life-changing, or even life-
saving, innovations are on the horizon.  
We can guarantee that, through vigilance in 
our role as competition law enforcers, we will 
preserve incentives to innovate while promoting the 
competitive process.  
 I very much thank you, James and Fordham, 
for inviting me back.  Regardless of the outcome of 
these elections, I anticipate this might be my very 
last one as the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust.  It has been an absolute privilege to be 
here and share these thoughts. 
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   * * * 
MS. DAVIS:  Thank you very much, Executive 
Vice President Vestager and Assistant Attorney General 
Delrahim, for those remarks.  And a special thanks to 
the Assistant Attorney General to make sure we all 
have Video Killed the Radio Star stuck in our heads 
for the rest of the day.  [Laughter] 
I would like to open the Q&A part of this 
session by turning to the subject of merger control 
and touching on a few developments that we have seen 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
My first question is to Executive Vice 
President Vestager.  You recognized in your remarks 
that, given the crisis, we are going to see more 
consolidation going forward, and also that you and the 
Commission will be obviously very focused on avoiding 
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any excessive concentration. 
We have recently had the General Court’s 
judgment in the CK Telecoms v. Commission case 
annulling the Commission’s decision which prohibited 
the Telefónica UK O2/Hutchison 3G UK3 merger back in 
2016.  One of the key things coming out of that case 
was that the 2004 Merger Control Regulation regime did 
not lower the standard of intervention for these so-
called “gap” cases. 
I  know Commission officials have been quite 
critical of the judgment on the conference circuit in 
recent times, calling it contrary to the spirit of the 
EUMR.  I suspect you and I may well have very 
different views on the merits of the judgment because 
I was part of the team advising CK Hutchison on this. 
The CJEU is going to have the final say on 
interpretation of the “significant impediment to 
effective competition” (SIEC) test.  But, as we know, 
the wheels of justice do not turn particularly quickly 
in Europe, so I am interested to get your view on what 
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the judgment means for how the Commission will look at 
these sorts of gap cases in the interim period while 
we wait for the CJEU to rule. 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  I see 
that there is not only an academic interest; there is 
also a personal interest that you have in this 
question and the answer to it. 
One of the things that is very important in 
the question on teleco mergers is that you can see in 
our practice that we do not have a “magic number.”  It 
depends on the market situation.  I think that is very 
important to take onboard. 
Also, the UK case was a very specific case 
due to the way that it was set up with a network-
sharing arrangement, and I would be very careful to 
make that a general thing that can be generalized to 
any merger because, first and foremost, I think it is 
very important that every merger is investigated on 
the facts of the relevant market and how the merging 
parties are situated in that market. 
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You probably know that we tried to 
encourage, at least positively mention, pan-European 
consolidation.  We have a number of very big telecos 
in the European Union as well, but not as big as you 
have them in the United States where the big ones 
would have a presence in every state.  I think in 
Europe the one with the strongest presence is in 
fourteen Member States. 
The question is also very much on the side 
of the industry if one continues to pursue mergers 
within national markets or try to pursue a more pan-
European presence.  We of course do our best to build 
a regulatory environment that would cater for having a 
stronger single market also when it comes to telecos. 
MS. DAVIS:  To follow up on what you said, 
the General Court’s judgment can be of wider 
application because clearly that was more focused on 
the sort of gap case test and has wider application 
beyond just the teleco sector. 
Can we expect to see any difference in how 
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the Commission actually goes about assessing cases in 
those sorts of four-to-three scenarios that you 
mentioned in light of the General Court’s 
jurisprudence on these points? 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  Now that 
you have rephrased the question I will rephrase my 
answer.   
What is important here is that we need to be 
able to assess gap cases.  We need to be able to 
assess them on the merits of the case.  That is not 
changed by this judgment because, since we do not have 
a fixed view — I know that some think so, but it is 
not a situation that I at all can relate to, that we 
should have a fixed view as to the number — then of 
course there is no fixed rule for us to revise because 
of a judgment. 
We of course learn from every judgment.  
That goes without saying.  We live in a Union built on 
the rule of law.  The facts of the case, the objective 
facts that we can see and the facts that we get from 
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market participants, are our bread and butter.  So we 
will assess any case on the merits of it, and then of 
course eventually we will have the CJEU’s take on it 
as well, and then of course it will be final, and I 
think only then will it be really interesting to see 
what will be the final SIEC in cases like this. 
MR. DAVIS:  Thank you very much. 
I am going to hand over to Howard at this 
point. 
PROF. SHELANSKI:  Good morning.  Thank you 
very much. 
Before we turn to the U.S. side, Executive 
Vice President Vestager, I would like to follow up on 
Michele’s question with another question on the theme 
of mergers.  It again stems from your remarks about 
the likelihood that in the wake of economic crisis we 
are going to see efforts for reorganization of 
businesses and some realignments in certain markets. 
I think in the global context in which we 
operate — that gives rise to this kind of conference — 
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a lot of these mergers are going to be 
multijurisdictional and touch on a number of different 
countries. 
The concept that merger notification 
thresholds are coterminous with jurisdiction has long 
been a central tenet in Europe.  How have stakeholders 
reacted to the Commission’s recent announcement that 
Member State authorities will be encouraged to refer 
cases to the Commission even if those cases are not 
notifiable in the referring Member State’s 
jurisdiction?   
How does this practice fit with the 
International Competition Network’s best practices, 
which require a material nexus with the reviewing 
jurisdiction, and the Commission’s longstanding 
advocacy of those practices?   
I would be interested to hear really what 
you have in mind with that recommendation and how it 
will be implemented going forward. 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  As you 
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probably know, for quite some time we have had an 
ongoing consultation about how we set merger 
thresholds; how do we get to see the right mergers 
that will have effects in the marketplace. 
One thing was the question of minority 
shareholding because we had a case that we were able 
to assess because it was directly referred to us.  
That gave us sort of food for thought: should we 
change in order to see more of those without referral?  
Here we assess that changing the notification laws 
would give us many, many cases but no certainty that 
we will actually get to see the ones that were 
important. 
It is kind of the same thing here.  We have 
a worry or a concern about the market effects when 
giant businesses buy up smaller innovative businesses 
before the scaleup phase.  Without prejudice 
obviously, it will be very interesting to see.  So 
far, we have seen the cases based on referrals.  Those 
include the Facebook/WhatsApp and the 
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Microsoft/LinkedIn cases. 
Again here we were going through what would 
enable us to see these cases.  Again, we found it 
would not be proportional to ask all of these cases to 
be notified.  That would give a lot of notifications, 
a lot of red tape for industry to deal with, and we 
did not find that to be proportional. 
So we were looking for another way of 
dealing with this, and this is why we came to think of 
Article 22 and to make better use of those referrals.  
I think for a number of years we have been 
discouraging this, but I think here we will of course 
discuss with the Member States how to make this system 
work. 
The criteria will be the same.  The 
Commission can only accept a referral for a 
transaction that affects trade between Member States 
and that significantly affects competition within the 
territory of the referring Member State.  I think 
those two principles give certainty, so it is also 
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possible for acquiring companies to have a quite clear 
idea of whether or not this is a case that has the 
potential of being referred to us. 
But we are not done yet because we are still 
in the process of discussing the procedural and 
practical aspects with the national competition 
authorities.  We hope to be done with that, give or 
take, late spring next year in order to make this 
system work.  There is a lot of unease on our side if 
there are things that we miss — but again, obviously 
without prejudice, because every case will have to be 
assessed on its merits. 
PROF. SHELANSKI:  Thank you. That is very 
helpful and gives us a better idea of what you have in 
mind.  We will look forward to the development of that 
framework. 
Let me turn it back to Michele for the next 
question. 
MS. DAVIS:  Thank you, Howard. 
I am heading to Washington now and to  
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Assistant Attorney General Delrahim. 
You talked in your remarks about the 
importance of promoting substantive and procedural 
convergence with your international partners.  As we 
rapidly approach the end of the Brexit transition 
period, we are going to see the UK CMA taking over 
jurisdiction for a large number of global deals and, 
in the words of the CMA’s chief executive, “taking 
back control genuinely of the decisions.” 
The CMA has shown in recent times that it is 
not afraid of applying novel theories of harm and 
innovative analytical approaches, and in fact, it is 
not afraid of blocking international transactions 
involving no UK companies even when in some cases 
those transactions have been cleared by other major 
and respected competition authorities, including the 
U.S. agencies. 
The recent abandonment of the 
Taboola/Outbrain deal follows a run of CMA decisions 
which have contributed to U.S.-centered deals 
 61 
 
 
 
 
collapsing.  Think about things like Illumina/PacBio 
and Thermo Fisher Scientific/Roper Technologies.  
Given the insurgence of the CMA on the international 
stage post-Brexit, do you think it is possible that we 
are entering a new era of transatlantic divergence on 
certain deals, and what do you think this means for 
how the United States and the CMA will cooperate on 
transactions going forward? 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:  Thanks 
for that question, Michele.  That’s a good question.  
I think it remains to be seen what transpires.  
Certainly, this is a shift from what we have seen over 
the past thirty or so years. 
I am confident that we will not see the type 
of divergence where it is going to be disruptive or 
harmful to global competition and commerce. 
Taboola/Outbrain was one where we ended up 
not taking action. However, we did recognize that the 
local facts and the impact on competition were 
different in Israel as far as the number of 
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competitors who were participating in that type of 
product offering.  We had differences in how to prove 
the exact market definition.  Were we talking about 
native ads?  I don’t know what kind of advertising you 
would call it specifically; but is it all digital 
advertising — probably not, like the parties had 
advanced — but it might not have been the type of 
content recommendation but maybe a little bit broader. 
We were working closely with not only our 
friends in Europe but also the Israeli authority where 
the two companies were domiciled.  It is not a big 
surprise that you will have a merger that will have 
different impacts in different jurisdictions.   
The question is: Is the analytical approach 
different?  I thought the analytical approach was 
largely the same. 
Sabre/Farelogix was another one where we 
challenged it.  We went through trial and — despite 
the judge’s findings of the facts and the credibility 
of the witnesses on our side, based on the law, and I 
 63 
 
 
 
 
think a misapplication of the law, in a decision that 
has since been vacated — the judge held for the 
parties.  We never got a chance to fully appeal before 
they abandoned it.  But in the United Kingdom they did 
block it. 
The analysis and the outcome in those 
mergers were exactly the same between us and the 
United Kingdom. 
It is a very advanced agency with incredible 
capabilities in the United Kingdom, with great 
leaders, and I think a great and developed court 
system there to continue to evaluate the proper 
analytical approach. 
So I think it remains to be seen.  There 
always is a danger of divergence.  I have not seen the 
evidence so far, but we have not had the experience 
yet with the full Brexit in effect. 
MS. DAVIS:  Thank you. 
I will hand it back to you, Howard. 
PROF. SHELANSKI: 
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I would like to depart from the theme of 
mergers.  Mr. Assistant Attorney General, I was very 
interested in your comment about the efforts you have 
taken to strengthen and revamp civil conduct 
enforcement. 
When we look back over the past twenty years 
or so, I think there has been a divergence in the 
appetite to pursue antimonopoly cases, single-firm 
tech cases, between the European Commission and the 
U.S. agencies.  Indeed, we had the Section 2 report on 
single-firm conduct during the Bush Administration 
that established certain safe harbors and adopted 
certain presumptions that made it harder to enforce 
those cases and suggested that the U.S. agencies, or 
at least the Department of Justice, would not be 
pursuing them with quite the (inaudible). 
Obviously, in recent times we have seen what 
looks like a resurgence of Section 2 cases, 
antimonopoly enforcement — certainly the FTC’s case 
against Qualcomm and (inaudible) and a variety of 
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other cases of lower profile in which we have seen 
investigations and enforcement actions. 
Is it fair to say that we are seeing a 
return or a resurgence of Section 2 enforcement?  Is 
this a shift in philosophy or is this driven by 
certain market segments? 
Is the House Judiciary Committee report that 
Executive Vice President Vestager referred to a 
harbinger of more of a focus on Section 2? 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:  Thank 
you, Howard. 
I think it is probably a little bit “all of 
the above” as far as the factors weighing in.  A lot 
of it depends on sometimes how risk-averse people are.  
I have been to some extent surprised at how 
conservative the enforcers have been about taking the 
risks. 
I think it is important to advance the law, 
take the risk where you can appropriately when there 
is a case.  I don’t know the exact numbers, but I 
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believe I have opened at least six — it might be more 
— Section 2 conduct cases during my tenure, which is 
probably more than in the last ten years combined as 
far as Section 2 type cases.  It was not just because 
we wanted to do that because of a statistic; it was 
because we saw cases and we were willing to go after 
them. 
Part of the challenge is the fact that those 
are hard, they are difficult, and there is a number of 
factors that feed into that difficulty. 
One, the most important, is resources.  We 
are at the resource level of twenty years ago.  The 
level of complexity and the volume of information that 
is available, just because of email and text messages 
and the generation of digital documents, is huge.  
Now, of course, we have computer-aided search through 
the discovery material, but the volume of information 
that we get in any investigation is huge and the 
number of staff we have has remained the same.  In 
fact, the effective budget of the Antitrust Division 
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at the FTC is about 25 percent lower than ten years 
ago. 
For the last two and a half years I have 
been pounding the pavement to get it.  Finally, we 
have an administration request for an additional 10 or 
12 percent increase in budget.  I was pleased that 
there was bipartisan recognition in the House report 
that the agencies need more resources. 
When you have resource deficiencies, you 
have transactions, like mergers, that have statutory 
deadlines to them; you have to deal with them.  So 
what does that mean?  It means that conduct 
transactions that do not have deadlines might have to 
take a back seat, unfortunately. 
You have criminal cartel cases that have 
statutes of limitations in them.  Those folks need to 
be continuing on, and that has been quite active for 
us. 
So I think institutionally there has been a 
little bit of reticence to advance Section 2. 
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Let me throw in another one, which I 
mentioned.  Part of the motivation behind creating the 
Civil Conduct Task Force internally to address it is 
that a lot of our attorneys are trained and think that 
because of the statutory requirements for merger 
filings. 
As you know, Howard — you were a top 
regulator at both the FTC and the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the White House, 
so you know this area — when you have a business that 
has a merger they want to get through, you ask them 
for information — you know, maybe they play around 
with some privileges, but by and large they are 
compliant.  You may ask for times and deadlines, but 
when you ask them for information they will give it to 
you.  Why?  Because the leverage is with the agencies 
— if there has been a second request, if they have not 
complied —to delay the merger.  So there is a real 
natural incentive, and therefore the leverage allows 
for the parties to come together. 
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Well, that is just not the case.  Just like 
in private practice, if  you sue a party, it might 
take a while to get that discovery in if they are not 
complying.  The same thing with the agencies.  The 
parties may take a different action and you need to be 
aggressive.  We have come on the brink, literally 
within thirty minutes on three different occasions, to 
enforce a CID or a second request response which has 
been deficient in the Antitrust Division.  Frankly, we 
have not done that.   
We probably need some enhancements in the 
laws to allow the Division and the FTC to enforce that 
when the parties do not comply in Section 2.  This is 
something that was not addressed in the House report 
but something that should be considered. 
So a lot of those factors weigh into that.  
But I also think that certain industries, as you 
mentioned, probably do impact that, and part of that 
is the fact that the digital economy has basically 
manifested three or four companies — some of which are 
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under investigation by the Justice Department and some 
by the FTC — that hold a certain amount of market 
share. 
Now, that doesn’t mean that just because of 
that they violate the antitrust laws, but there has 
been a lot of media and academic attention to it, and 
now Capitol Hill attention to it, and the agencies are 
paying more attention to what Section 2 is. 
I don’t think ten years ago if you and I 
told our social colleagues who may not be in the 
antitrust world, “I practice antitrust law,” their 
first question would ask, “What the hell is that?”  
Now people know what antitrust law is, for good or 
bad, because some them think antitrust should just 
preclude any company from getting big. 
But we are having that debate, people are 
engaging, and I think that is a positive thing for 
competition overall. 
PROF. SHELANSKI:  Thank you very much. 
MS. DAVIS:  I am conscious that we are going 
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to lose you very quickly, Executive Vice President 
Vestager, but I couldn’t let you get away without 
asking a question about the new legislative proposal 
in relation to the New Competition Tool. 
You mentioned earlier in your remarks the 
formidable tools that the European Commission has in 
competition law enforcement in Europe.  Those 
formidable tools — think about Articles 101 and 102 — 
have served the Commission very well over the years 
and have formed the backbone of competition policy and 
have actually shown themselves to be very flexible in 
adapting to new situations.  We have seen that even in 
recent times in digital markets. 
Is the New Competition Tool really needed or 
can you not use the existing formidable toolbox that 
you have to achieve the sorts of outcomes that you are 
looking for? 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  The 
thing is that we really appreciate what Articles 101 
and 102 have done, and they will work beautifully for 
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a very long future, if not perpetually, because these 
are the pillars of what we do. 
But what we have been doing for quite some 
time is to look at how markets are changing, how 
market dynamics are changing.  I have three special 
advisers who produced a report, “Competition Policy in 
the Digital Era.”  A number of national competition 
authorities in other jurisdictions are trying to 
figure out how to address the fact that market 
dynamics are new — business models are new; we have 
network effects; we have marginal cost approaching 
zero; we have zero-price markets — so there is 
something that we need here in order to make sure that 
we remain efficient in what we do. 
Basically, we base our work on three 
different pillars: 
• Obviously, vigilantly to enforce the 
existing rules that we have, making full use of 
Articles 101 and 102, including interim measures and 
restorative remedies.   
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• Second, ex ante regulation of platforms, 
as mentioned, including additional requirements for 
gatekeepers.   
• Third, this New Competition Tool.  The 
inspiration comes from colleagues quite spread on the 
planet.  The CMA in the United Kingdom has done 
amazing work with the tools they have at their 
disposal, but we have also seen that with other 
colleagues and have discussed that.  I think you would 
find it within the ICN.  
The point is here that our tools enable us 
to investigate businesses but we lack the tool to 
investigate a market and be able to prevent that 
market from tipping.  We have seen that now quite a 
number of times, that markets with these network 
effects, the marginal costs go down; they tend to tip. 
If we want to make sure that these markets 
stay contestable, that there is the challenge to every 
company to stay innovative, then we will need a new 
tool.   
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I think there is a global consensus on the 
challenge that we have ahead of us.  I think also if 
others look into what colleagues have in their toolbox 
they would have the same admiration for the work that 
they have done.  You should, of course, expect nothing 
revolutionary or unheard of, but I think there is a 
true need to complement our toolbox and we are 
preparing the legislation to be able to do that. 
Of course, the important thing that we 
always carry in our heart is to make sure that we have 
the processes right because it is a Union built on the 
rule of law, and that will obviously also be reflected 
in how the New Competition Tool should work. 
MS. DAVIS:  Some of the criticisms that have 
leveled towards the proposals are that intervention in 
this way could actually have the opposite effect and 
cause harm to competition and innovation. 
I was struck when you mentioned in your 
remarks earlier that politicians cannot answer who 
will win and who will lose very well. 
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Some of the types of conduct that may be 
targeted by the tool appear indistinguishable from 
successful organic growth as the result of innovation 
and competition on the merits. 
Is there a danger of the Commission 
effectively being in the role of picking winners and 
losers, and is that something that the Commission 
should be involved in in a free-market economy? 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  Of 
course not.  If that was the case, we shouldn’t. 
But, exactly as you say, when you have a 
market economy there has to be a market and the market 
has to be free and contestable. 
What we have observed is that that is not a 
given thing.  Some market dynamics may lead to an 
outcome where you do not any more have contestable 
markets, where you do not any more have a fair chance 
of making it in that marketplace, because of the 
characteristics of this market. 
I think that is the important thing to have 
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in mind, that if you want to serve well the 
fundamental mission to have fair competition on the 
merits in an open marketplace, then we need to make 
sure that our toolkit is up-to-date, because otherwise 
we may fail dramatically in serving consumers and 
customers in the best possible way. 
Of course any tool should be used with 
caution, but you need specific tools for specific 
issues.  I don’t know if anyone has tried to put in a 
screw with a hammer — the result is not very good.  
You need indeed to have the right tool for the right 
situation, and this is what we are trying to achieve 
here. 
MS. DAVIS:  Thank you. 
VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  I will say good-
bye. 
MS. DAVIS:  Thank you very much.  I am sorry 
to keep you late. 
VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:  No, no, no.  I am 
so honored that you have invited me again and that you 
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have made this happen.  It has indeed been a pleasure 
to be here.   
Also, of course, I very much appreciate 
Makan’s remarks because it is indeed an inspiring and 
a learning opportunity to hear colleagues, and also to 
be challenged by your questions.   
Thank you very much for all the effort and 
good luck with the rest of the Conference. 
PROF. SHELANSKI: In my last question I would 
like to follow on the theme of new tools and also pick 
up on a question that was submitted to us from the 
audience.  This question goes to you, Makan. 
When we look at the Health Judiciary 
Committee report, there are a number of proposals that 
the Committee makes and they are forward-looking 
legislative recommendations of a fairly broad kind. 
You said during the course of your remarks 
that you think we have the tools to adapt and adjust 
to new industries, and you made an interesting point 
in your response to my question about conduct cases, 
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that it is a question of taking a different risk 
perspective, worrying perhaps a little bit more about 
error costs on the other side and being a bit bolder 
through existing tools. 
What is your view of the legislate proposal 
and, more generally, the need for new legislation as 
articulated in the House Judiciary Committee’s report? 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:  First, 
I’ve got to congratulate the tremendous amount of good 
work that the House Judiciary Committee put into their 
report. 
It is a process.  As you know, I am a big 
believer, as I know you are, in the separation of the 
powers.  The Executive Branch and we enforce the law, 
and there are certain due process procedures that are 
afforded to various folks before you adjudicate 
somebody has actually broken the law.   
Not to take anything away from that, but 
there is a process that ends in the legislative 
process — and I have had the privilege of spending 
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about five years when I first left private practice to 
be on the Senate Judiciary Committee back a little 
over twenty years ago when we were looking at 
Microsoft — and it is an important process to look at 
and fine-tune the tools that we have and the 
processes, to take a look at the laws. 
There are a number of recommendations.  The 
very first one is that the agencies need more 
resources.  I think that is a good recommendation. 
There are a number of other areas in there, 
and we provided some technical assistance to the House 
at their request.  We do not have Administration 
positions that have been cleared through the Office of 
Management and Budget and the  Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs that you used to head.  It is a 
public process. 
But I think generally I would favor changes 
that do not throw out the baby with the bathwater.  We 
already, I think, over-impose on the courts to force 
them to understand.  You have a judge who may not have 
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in a twenty-year career ever had an antitrust case and 
for the first time who may ask the question, “What the 
heck am I supposed to do with this merger?  I have to 
be clairvoyant and look into the future of this 
effect?  I am used to knowing whether not the guy 
entered into an agreement or sold a drug, and I need a 
picture and evidence and an eye witness.  That’s what 
I’m used to.” 
You are asking the judge, plus three 
brilliant clerks who just got out of law school who 
are helping them, to in six or eight months resolve a 
$100 billion merger that the two agencies may have 
spent fifty attorneys and economists and God knows the 
amount of outside resources the parties and the 
brilliant economists — Dennis Carlton, Carl Shapiro, 
and Howard Shelanski — that they use.  I think the 
system requires some review as well. 
I am not a huge fan of specialized courts in 
general.  Congress experimented and by and large that 
has been successful for patent cases in the Federal 
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Circuit.  But Judge Ginsburg had also yet another 
innovative idea, almost like a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, where the chief justice could 
appoint judges with expertise to build a core 
competency of antitrust expertise in these cases so 
that judges are not just completely shocked and 
surprised by the demands of an antitrust case, because 
I think the markets require that. 
The other is, particularly in the high-tech 
area, I think the laws are flexible enough to identify 
— certainly the House Judiciary Committee found that 
some of the companies violated the laws as they exist. 
The agencies go through that.  The question 
is: How fast are we going to have an answer to be 
responsive, to provide the certainty for the companies 
but also to protect the consumers from the vagrancies 
or the transgressions by some of these companies that 
might occur, new innovations. 
I was again pleased that they cited the 
Venture Capital Workshop that we held at Stanford in 
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February 2020 in their report.  I thought that was 
good. 
So I would look at the system.  I would also 
look at just the system we have in the United States, 
the two federal agencies enforcing the antitrust laws, 
which sometimes could create confusion and 
uncertainty, the structures of them.  I probably have 
a personal bias towards one agency, but I am not 
saying one or the other is the better model. 
Also look at federal versus state.  We 
already have potential divergence internationally, but 
do we really need that?  I am a big fan of actually 
looking at the European model of how the Commission 
and the state and the agencies look at it.  For 
transactions that do not bleed outside of state lines, 
defer more enforcement to the state AGs, to the extent 
they want to — some states may not have the interest 
or the resources and they would prefer that, but to 
the extent they want to, as long as they do not 
contradict national competition policy. 
 83 
 
 
 
 
So I think there are a couple of other areas 
that I would encourage the policymakers to look at.  
But changing predatory pricing — the Brown & 
Williamson case from the Supreme Court — we have to be 
very careful about how we do that.   
I do believe that there are different tests 
that I would apply to the Supreme Court’s Amex case, 
so I think that is an interesting exploration by the 
House and I would welcome looking at how you would do 
that.  I am a big believer in the test that we at the 
beginning of my tenure proposed to the Supreme Court 
in that case, and how the Second Circuit looked at 
market definition, and also how you account for 
procompetitive justifications of a vertical restraint 
in a two-sided market.  I do believe you have to look 
at two-sided markets differently, but I do believe the 
Second Circuit got it wrong.  Of course, five Justices 
disagreed with that view.   
But that is an area that I think is rife for 
mischief and misinterpretation through litigation, and 
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frankly businesses need certainty.  
We saw a brilliant judge in Delaware in the 
Sabre case who I think just plainly got it wrong, but 
that decision is rife for lots of litigation for the 
next twenty years unless Congress comes in and puts in 
some bright lines. 
Those are my general views. 
PROF. SHELANSKI:  Thank you.  That is a very 
helpful answer. 
I think we are coming up on the end of this 
session.  Many of us may be looking longingly at 
Michele’s espresso machine. 
I want to thank you very much, Makan and 
Michele, and turn it back to James. 
MR. KEYTE: Thank you, Makan, Michele, and 
Howard, and Executive Vice President Vestager as well. 
That was a wonderful session. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:  Thanks 
very much for having me, James, and I look forward to 
the rest of your Conference, as always. 
